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Mr. Kahlen

To: EUR - Mr. Jandry  
 Via: DRW - Mr. Fred Sanderson **FS**  
 From: CER - E. Malby **EM**  
 Subject: Review of Proposals on European Security  
 (Revised)

Following is a compilation of major Western proposals on European security. Part I summarizes Western governmental and non-governmental proposals, Part II sketches opinion in key European countries.

# I. WESTERN PROPOSALS

## A. Official

1. July 19, 1955: Eden proposal at the summit conference indicates readiness to discuss force and armament levels both in Germany and in states neighboring Germany, as a step towards a demilitarized area between East and West.
2. October 27, 1955: At the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference the three Western Powers, submit a draft Treaty of Assurance to be concluded concurrently with an agreement on German unification by free elections. Among the measures proposed was the limitation of forces and armaments on both sides of the eastern frontier of a reunified Germany together with additional "special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations" in a zone immediately astride the frontier.
3. March 16, 1956: The Federal Republic, in a note to the three Western Powers on the eve of the disarmament conference, coupled German reunification to disarmament and asked to be informed of the progress of the conference as it vitally affected Germany.
4. May 3, 1956: Foreign Minister Pineau proposed a new plan incorporating disarmament, European security and German reunification.
5. September 7, 1956: A Federal Republic note delivered in Moscow enclosed a memorandum offering military guarantees to the USSR which would enable it to agree to German reunification.
6. December 18, 1956: Secretary Dulles stated that the United States was not "contemplating any reduction of US military strength in Europe" and was "not prepared to review the military situation in Europe on any basis which presupposes a line drawn through Germany." The Secretary stated further that the United States is very open-minded to any suggestions that might be made as to the status -- whether neutralization or otherwise -- of satellite countries which would take away any fear by the USSR that it would be physically or militarily endangered if it facilitated the evolution to independence in the satellites.

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8. April 29, 1957: Foreign Minister Brentano calls on USSR to restore peace in the world by acceptance of a comprehensive disarmament agreement which would include atomic weapons.

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11. January 4, 1958: Macmillian calls for "solemn pact of nonaggression" as a possible first step toward East-West negotiations.

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1. March 1, 1956: FDP spokesman Erich Mende proposed the conclusion of a treaty between the US and the USSR and adhered to by the UK, France and Germany, or, alternatively, a 15-power pact to include smaller nations. He further proposed withdrawal of NATO troops behind the Rhine, and of Warsaw pact troops beyond the Oder-Neisse line, with the resultant military vacuum to be filled by 12 or more West German divisions.

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
6. March 20, 1957: Ollenhauer in an interview with Borba (Yugoslavia) says that discussion of thinned-out zones in Europe does not go to the heart of the German problem; unification must be achieved on basis of agreement among the four powers on the military status of a reunified Germany.

7. June 16, 1957: Ollenhauer at the Dortmund election kickoff rally favors withdrawal of East and West Germany from the Warsaw and NATO alliances, and the creation of an all-European security system including a reunified Germany guaranteed by the US and USSR.

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9. November 24, 1957: George F. Kennan urges Western powers to consider proposing the neutralization of Germany through the withdrawal of foreign forces, thereby putting the onus for delaying a reasonable European settlement on the USSR.

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## II. WESTERN OPINION

### A. West Germany


1. Government. Because of pressures from both public opinion and the SPD, for whom the atom-free zone proposal has become a political tool rather than an item of actual conviction, all proposals for a European settlement will tend to be studied on their merits. The government however is firmly against both the atom-free zone proposal, and negotiations with Pankow. It is felt that since Germany has something to fear from the freezing of the status quo, an atom-free zone does not solve either the security nor the unification problem; it is believed that the best safeguard remains US strength within the framework of NATO.

2. Public Opinion. Public reaction as expressed in the press, has evinced wide interest in the proposal for "de-nuclearized" zones, and in other proposals such as those contained in the Kennan lectures. While the SPD-oriented press echoes these proposals as part of editorial policy, the very breadth of comment in all papers is evidence of wide-spread concern. This concern, however, tends to reflect a yearning for a relief of seemingly eternal tensions, rather than adherence to any particular solution. Strong anxieties lest US protection be withdrawn or weakened remains the basic undertone.

### B. Italy

1. Government. Although there has been no official reaction of the Italian Government reported as yet (January 14, 1958) to the Russian proposal for the atomic neutralization of Italy, it is predictable on the basis of Italian policy to date and the reaction of the political secretary of the party which controls the government that it will be rejected by the Italian Government.

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


2. Public Opinion. Again, few reports have as yet been received. As stated above, the political secretary of Italy's largest party, Christian Democracy (DC), said in a political speech January 12 that the proposal could not be accepted. Similarly, the reactions of the Roman Catholic clergy have been reported to be cold to a Russian proposal made at the same time, that the Soviet and the Vatican cooperate in preventing war. Moreover, non-Roman Catholic democratic parties in Italy have always been strong supporters of NATO, while Italian Rightists are not likely to accept such a proposal either.

C. Scandinavian

1. Government. The governments of the Northern countries have not expressed any special preference for any of the recently suggested arrangements such as nuclear-free zones or non-aggression pacts, but they all favor exploring every possibility for agreement with the Soviets that would work toward a European security arrangement whereby Germany would be reunified, armaments reduced, and the testing of nuclear weapons halted. Until an arrangement acceptable to the West should become a reality, however, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland regard their adherence to NATO as their best guarantee of security. Although agreeing in principle to the stationing of IRBM's in the NATO countries, Norway and Denmark have thus far declared opposition to the stationing of missiles on their territories. Sweden considers a posture of neutrality backed by a strong defense that in all likelihood will include domestically produced nuclear weapons to be in its best interest. It also implicitly relies on NATO to come to its aid in case of attack. Finland realizes that it is bound by the mutual assistance pact of 1948 forced upon it by the USSR and relies on its traditional postwar policy of strict neutrality.

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
D. United Kingdom

Government and Public Opinion. Under pressure from British public opinion, which clearly favors talks with the Russians, Prime Minister MacMillan in a report on the NATO Conference broadcast on January 4, 1958 under the auspices of the Conservative Party, suggested that a solemn non-aggression pact with the Russians might be a useful prelude to discussions on disarmament and other matters to relieve world tensions. The proposal was offered almost as an aside after a long defense of the need to preserve the strength of NATO and did not mean, as the Foreign Office subsequently explained, that Britain favored "a non-aggression pact in isolation" from other agreements. Public opinion in Britain has been concerned with the dangers involved in the presence of nuclear-armed SAC bombers in Britain and more recently with the decision to establish missile sites. The Government in the face of opposition criticism has stated that SAC and the missile sites are vital for Britain's defense and has assured the House that Britain has a complete negative control over the use of these weapons.

E. France

French official attitudes towards problems of European security have apparently remained substantially unchanged by recent developments such as the MacMillan proposal, the Kennan article, the Bulganin notes and the Polish proposal for a demuclearized zone. Despite proposals of a "thinned out" zone in central Europe advanced by Jules Moch, the French Government appears resolutely opposed to any proposals of a neutral or demuclearized zone in the absence of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. In its view such moves

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would greatly weaken the position of NATO, considered by the French as the bulwark of European security. The government, however, is in favor of a summit meeting to discuss outstanding East-West differences if it is preceded by preparatory conferences at lower levels such as a foreign ministers meeting.

2. Public opinion as reflected in French newspapers appears to be in agreement with official attitudes. With the exception of the extreme left press, practically all newspapers approached the MacMillan proposals with skepticism and were openly hostile to the Polish proposal. The press commented on an apparent detente in the East-West conflict and the possibility of successful summit conference but this was accompanied by continued suspicion toward Russian intentions.

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REVIEW OF PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

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A. Official

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
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5. December 18, 1956: Secretary Dulles stated that the United States was not "contemplating any reduction of US military strength in Europe" and was "not prepared to review the military situation in Europe on any <sup>basis</sup> which presupposes a line drawn through Germany."

6. In February 1957 at the WEU Foreign Ministers meeting Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd proposed a "Grand Design" for European organization, political, military, and economic, with a single parliament and open to neutral, and perhaps in time Eastern European, states.

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
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
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II. SOVIET BLOC PROPOSALS

1. July 23, 1955 -- Premier Bulganin at the Geneva summit conference modified the Soviet position on a European security system, which was first put forth at the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference (February 1954) and would have required the immediate dissolution of NATO. A system of all-European security to be accomplished in two stages was offered, with a renunciation of the use of force by the powers involved, in the first stage, and the complete dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, formed subsequent to the February 1954 proposal, in the second stage.

2. October 28, 1955 -- Foreign Minister Molotov repeated the Soviet proposal for a gradual two-stage creation of a collective security system in Europe, with a Treaty on Collective Security in Europe in the first stage which would freeze the level of armed forces stationed in Europe by signatories to the treaty.

Molotov also put forth Soviet proposals for the creation of a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe," based on the Eden plan presented at the Geneva summit meeting, to include both German states and "states bordering them, or at least certain ones of them." Within this zone Big Four forces would be subject to limitation, and joint inspection of armed forces and armaments would be carried out within the zone.

3. March 27, 1956 -- The Soviet disarmament plan presented at the London disarmament talks incorporated as Part III the proposals made by Molotov at Geneva for the creation of a zone of arms limitation and inspection in an area, at this time vaguely defined as "both parts of Germany and of the States adjacent to them." Prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone, agreed freezing of foreign forces in the area, and, pending final agreement, unilateral reduction of Big Four manpower in the area were measures proposed. Part IV initiated a proposal for prohibition of atomic weapons in Germany, to take effect within three months.

4. November 17, 1956 -- A Bulganin letter suggested reduction by one-third of Big Four armed forces stationed on German soil, as well as a "significant reduction" of forces stationed in other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the two European military alliances and inspection at points of possible "dangerous concentration of armed forces" were included again. A new feature was Soviet acceptance of aerial inspection to a depth of 800 kilometers on each side of the present East-West demarcation line.

5. July 26, 1957 -- An East German statement on reunification revived a Soviet proposal for an all-German council made at the Geneva conference on November 2. The formation of a confederation (originally suggested by the SED in January 1957) was conditioned on West German

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acceptance of (1) a ban on storing and manufacture of atomic weapons on German soil and a ban on "war propaganda," (2) resignation of the two German states from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, abolition of conscription, and agreement on military manpower, and (3) joint or separate German requests to the Big Four for early, gradual withdrawal of troops from Germany.

6. October 2, 1957 -- Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki announced to the UN General Assembly that Poland would agree to ban atomic weapons from her territory if both parts of Germany agreed to such a policy. Czechoslovakia immediately associated itself with so-called "Rapacki plan," enlarging the scope of the proposed "atom-free zone" to four countries.


7. December 10, 1957 -- Bulganin's letters to the heads of NATO governments modified the "Rapacki Plan" with the suggestion that an agreement between the two German states, which would be joined by Czechoslovakia and Poland, follow agreement by the US, USSR, and Great Britain not to deploy any nuclear weapons on German territory. These letters also repeated the familiar Soviet proposal for a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

8. January 8, 1958 -- The Bulganin letters to all NATO members included an annex -- also sent to all other UN members -- which called for an East-West conference and set forth the familiar Soviet proposals for a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and an atom-free zone in Central Europe. The reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe and the replacement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by a collective security system were called "more radical steps" which could better be discussed later after agreement on other proposals had been successfully concluded.

The letters to Denmark and Norway in this series took favorable note of their reservations to the acceptance of missiles at the December NATO meeting, and suggested the extension of the atom-free zone to include all of Northern Europe. In effect, this was a continuation of the Communist Baltic "Sea of Peace" campaign which has emphasized "peaceful coexistence" and neutrality in Northern Europe since mid-1956.

Bulganin's letter to Italy also emphasized the advantages of "atomic neutrality" for Italy. On January 11 Foreign Minister Gromyko pushed this suggestion further with the comment to a visiting Italian Communist Senator that Italy might be included in such a scheme, hinting that in exchange for nuclear weapons might be excluded from Albania. In effect Moscow was thus extending the scope of the Rapacki Plan from the Arctic to the Mediterranean Sea. Neither the Poles nor the Soviets have elaborated the means by which the scheme would be controlled.

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III. WESTERN OPINION

A. West Germany


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2. Public Opinion. Public reaction as expressed in the press, has evinced wide interest in the proposal for a "de-nuclearized" force, and in other proposals such as those contained in the Kennan lectures. While the SPD-oriented press echoes these proposals as part of editorial policy, the very breadth of comment in all papers is evidence of wide-spread concern. This concern, however, tends to reflect a yearning for a relief of seemingly eternal tensions, rather than adherence to any particular solution. Strong anxieties lest US protection be withdrawn or weakened remains the basic undertone.

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
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
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